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NEW TRIALS - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW - NEW TRIAL NOT WARRANTED UNLESS 
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE SATISFIES THRESHOLD 
REQUIREMENT OF MATERIALITY TO THE OUTCOME OF 
THE CASE. Stevenson v. State, 299 Md. 297, 473 A.2d 450 (1984). 
Nearly two years after the defendant's conviction for first degree 
murder and related offenses,l the prosecutor discovered that one of the 
state's expert witnesses had testified falsely about his academic creden-
tials.2 When the defendant became aware of this perjury, she promptly 
filed a motion for a new trial. 3 The trial judge, who had heard the origi-
nal case, denied the motion because of the overwhelming evidence of the 
defendant's guilt, independent of the perjured testimony.4 The Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed in an unreported opinion.5 On fur-
ther appeal, the court of appeals chose to enlarge the scope of review to 
include an additional claim that the state's use of perjured testimony vio-
lated the defendant's due process right to a fair trial. 6 A unanimous court 
held that a new trial was not warranted because the new evidence failed 
to meet a threshold requirement of materiality to the outcome of the 
case.7 
It is undisputed that a trial court has the authority to grant a new 
trial because of newly discovered evidence.8 Courts, however, have been 
reluctant to exercise this power,9 citing the need to avoid the time and 
expense of retrials lO and the desire to advance the public policy associ-
1. Prior to the discovery of the perjury, the convictions were affirmed on appeal. Ste-
venson v. State, 289 Md. 167,423 A.2d 558 (1980). 
2. The expert in question testified that he had graduated cum laude from the Illinois 
School of Technology. The state's attorney was informed by the Illinois Depart-
ment of Law Enforcement's Division of Criminal Investigation that the expert had 
not graduated from the school. Stevenson v. State, 299 Md. 297, 300,473 A.2d 450, 
451 (1984). 
3. Md. R. Crim. P. 770(b) (Supp. 1983) (current version at MD. R. CRIM. P. § 4-
331(c» states that a court may grant a new trial on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence that, in the exercise of due diligence by the moving party, could not have 
been discovered within three days of the verdict. 
4. Stevenson v. State, 299 Md. 297, 301, 473 A.2d 450, 451 (1984). 
5. Stevenson v. State, No. 82-726, slip op. (Md. Ct. Spec. App. March 7, 1983) (per 
curiam), affd, 299 Md. 297, 473 A.2d 450 (1984). 
6. The due process issue was not raised in the trial court or the court of special ap-
peals. The defendant filed a motion on August 5, 1983 to enlarge the scope of re-
view upon writ of certiorari. Brief of Appellant Stevenson at 2 n.l, Stevenson v. 
State, 299 Md. 297, 473 A.2d 450 (1984). 
7. Stevenson v. State, 299 Md. 297, 302, 308, 473 A.2d 450, 452, 455 (1984). 
8. See generally 6A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1159.05 (2d ed. 1983) (a 
discussion of the origin and power to grant a new trial). 
9. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 654, 661 (11th Cir. 1983); United 
States v. Metz, 652 F.2d 478, 479 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Costello, 255 
F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958); Gehner v. McPherson, 
430 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968); see also 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE - FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 557, at 
315 (2d ed. 1982). 
10. See Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 
909 (1964); Town of Eliot v. Burton, 392 A.2d 56, 58 (Me. 1978). 
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ated with the finality of judgments. 1 1 This reluctance is reflected in the 
traditional standard used to review these new trial motions. 12 Under this 
standard, frequently referred to as the "Berry "13 or "probability" test, 
the moving party must show that: (1) the evidence was in fact discovered 
after the trial; (2) its absence from the first trial was not owing to the 
defendant's lack of diligence; (3) it is so material that it would probably 
produce a different verdict if the new trial were granted; and (4) it is not 
merely "cumulative" or "impeaching."14 
In certain cases, the evidence in question is not truly "newly discov-
ered," but rather it has been discovered that the witness perjured himself 
at trial. In these instances, a majority of the federal circuits IS and many 
state courtsI6 reject the Berry test in favor of the more lenient test set 
forth in Larrison v. United StatesY The Larrison test, also referred to as 
the "might" standard, permits a new trial when the court is "reasonably 
well satisfied" that: (1) the testimony given by a material witness is false; 
(2) the jury might have reached a different conclusion without it; and (3) 
the party seeking the new trial was either unable to meet the evidence 
because he was taken by surprise when the witness gave the false testi-
mony, or he did not know of its falsity until after trial. I8 Proponents of 
this lower standard of materiality justify it by arguing that a conviction 
based on perjured testimony affronts judicial integrity.I9 
Recently, two federal courts of appeals rejected the Larrison stan-
11. Gehner v. McPherson, 430 S.W.2d 312, 315 n.l (Mo. Ct. App. 1968). 
12. See 8A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 33.04[1] (2d ed. 1983); 4 C. 
TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 599 (12th ed. 1976); see generally 
Annot., 59 A.L.R. FED. 657 (1982) (listing federal cases that apply the traditional 
Berry standard); Annot., 158 A.L.R. 1062 (1945 & Supp.) (listing state cases that 
apply the traditional Berry standard). 
13. The traditional standard was first set forth in Berry v. Georgia, 10 Ga. 511, 526-27 
(1851). 
14. [d. at 527. In Berry, the court also required an affidavit from the witness, reflecting 
a concern for the creditability of the new evidence. [d. 
15. See, e.g., United States v. Gabriel, 597 F.2d 95, 98-100 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 858 (1979); United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir. 1976); United 
States v. Meyers, 484 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1973); see also 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 
9, § 557.1, at 343-44 (indicating Larrison standard is majority rule in the circuits). 
For a listing of the federal courts that have applied the Larrison standard, see An-
not., 59 A.L.R. FED. 657, 664-66 (1982). The Maryland practitioner may be inter-
ested to know that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has 
adopted the Larrison standard. See United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863, 866 
(4th Cir. 1976). 
16. See, e.g., Conlow v. State, 441 A.2d 638, 640 (Del. 1982); State v. Naeole, 62 Hawaii 
563, 617 P.2d 820, 824 (1980); State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 585 (Minn. 
1982). 
17. 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928). 
18. [d. at 87-88. 
19. Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956) ("waters of justice are polluted by 
the government's use of tainted testimony"); Communist Party v. Subversive Activi-
ties Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 124-25 (1956) (the "taint" of perjury can be removed 
only by a new trial); Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. 
denied, 377 U.S. 909 (1964); 8A J. MOORE, supra note 12, ~ 33.06[1]. 
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dard in favor of the stricter Berry "probability" standard.20 Primarily 
they criticize the Larrison "might" standard as being too speculative.21 
A literal application of the "might" standard, these courts contend, 
would require the granting of a new trial in every instance.22 Moreover, 
finding no basis for distinguishing between perjured testimony and other 
types of newly discovered evidence, these jurisdictions prefer to apply the 
Berry "probability" test uniformly to all new trial motions involving 
newly discovered evidence. 23 
Maryland adopted a functional equivalent of the Berry test in Jones 
v. State. 24 Cases that have cited it, however, lack uniformity in their 
analyses and applications of the Jones court's holding and have employed 
a variety of standards for review.2s Furthermore, the Maryland cases do 
not appear to distinguish between perjured testimony and other types of 
newly discovered evidence.26 This uncertainty in the decisions of the 
state's intermediate appellate court is caused in part by the judiciary'S 
strong policy of according great deference to trial courts' decisions on the 
20. United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 
942 (1980); United States V. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 246 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 819 (1976). For a review of other cases criticizing or modifying the Lar-
rison standard see Comment, Ninth Circuit Adopts Berry Standard for New Trials 
Based Upon Perjured Testimony, 11 GOLDEN GATE 171 (1981). 
21. United States V. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 
942 (1980); United States V. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 245-46 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). 
22. United States V. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 445 U.S. 
942 (1980); United States V. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 245-46 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). 
23. United States V. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 
942 (1980); United States V. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 246 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 819 (1976). 
24. 16 Md. App. 472, 298 A.2d 483, cert. denied, 268 Md. 750 (1973). Jones states: 
There must ordinarily be present and concur five verities, to wit: (a) 
The evidence must be in fact, newly discovered, i.e., discovered since the 
trial; (b) facts must be alleged from which the court may infer diligence on 
the part of the movant; (c) the evidence relied on, must not be merely 
cumulative or impeaching; (d) it must be material to issues involved; and 
(e) it must be such, and of such nature, as that, on a new trial, the newly 
discovered evidence would probably produce an acquittal. 
Id. at 477,298 A.2d at 486 (quoting Johnson V. United States, 32 F.2d 127, 130 (8th 
Cir. 1929». 
25. Compare Mack Trucks, Inc. V. Webber, 29 Md. App. 256, 277-78, 347 A.2d 865, 
877 (1975) (evidence must be of such nature that, on retrial, the newly discovered 
evidence would produce a different result) with Harker V. State, 55 Md. App. 460, 
475,463 A.2d 288, 297 (1983) (discovery of evidence would be likely to result in an 
acquittal) and Andresen V. State, 24 Md. App. 128, 212, 331 A.2d 78, 127 (1974) 
(applying a test that merely excises the disputed testimony and then ascertains 
whether the remaining evidence is still sufficient to uphold the conviction) (citing 58 
AM. JUR. 2D New Trial § 175 (1971». 
26. Stevenson V. State, No. 82-706, slip op. at 4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. March 7, 1983) 
(per curiam) ("we do not agree with appellant that newly discovered evidence of 
perjury calls for a different standard of review than newly discovered evidence gen-
erally"), affd, 299 Md. 297,473 A.2d 450 (1984). 
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motions.27 Only the most compelling and extraordinary circumstances 
will warrant a reversal.28 Accordingly, the focus thus far has been upon 
the exercise of discretion rather than upon the standard applied. 
The rules of criminal procedure give a defendant the right to peti-
tion for a new trial when newly discovered evidence of perjury stems 
from a neutral source. When the perjury can be attributed to the prose-
cution, however, the defendant's due process right to a fair trial is impli-
cated.29 A new trial motion based on a due process infringement 
therefore involves two separate inquiries: (1) whether the prosecution is 
responsible for the perjured testimony; and (2) whether the perjured tes-
timony is sufficiently material to warrant a new trial. 
The United States Supreme Court set forth the tests for both of 
these queries in United States v. Agurs.30 The first prong is satisfied if the 
prosecution "knew or should have known" that one of its witnesses was 
testifying falsely.3! This fault-fixing standard appears to encompass in-
stances of both prosecutorial misconduct and prosecutorial negligence. 32 
Once the prosecution is deemed responsible for the perjury, the court 
must determine whether the perjured testimony is sufficiently material to 
warrant a new trial. 33 The Agurs Court stated that a new trial should be 
granted if there is "any reasonable likelihood that the perjured testimony 
could have affected the judgment of the jury."34 This lower threshold of 
materiality reflects the Court's strong disapproval of state-sponsored 
27. See LO.A. Leasing Corp. v. Merle Thomas Corp., 260 Md. 243, 272 A.2d 1 (1971); 
Perlin Packing Co. v. Price, 247 Md. 475, 231 A.2d 702 (1967); Mack Trucks, Inc. 
v. Webber, 29 Md. App. 256, 347 A.2d 865 (1975). 
28. A.S. Abell Co. v. Skeen, 265 ~d. 53, 59, 288 A.2d 596, 599 (1972); Jones v. State, 
16 Md. App. 472,477, 298 A.2d 483, 486, cert. denied, 268 Md. 750 (1973). 
29. 8A J. MOORE, supra note 12, ~ 33.04; see also Mooney V. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 
(1935) (where the Supreme Court first established that the prosecution has a duty to 
disclose testimony known to be perjured). The Court broadened the Mooney princi-
ple in subsequent cases. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (when the non-
disclosure of evidence is material to either guilt or sentencing, a new trial is 
warranted, regardless of the good or bad faith of the prosecution); Napue V. Illinois, 
360 U.S. 264 (1959) (the false testimony need only relate to the credibility of a 
witness). The right to due process of law is preserved by the fifth (federal action) 
and fourteenth (state action) amendments to the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. 
amends. V & XIV, § 2. The Maryland Constitution also preserves the right to due 
process. See MD. DECL. OF RTS. art. 24. 
30. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
31. [d. at 103. The Agurs decision recited three types of situations involving nondisclo-
sure of evidence that would violate due process. The other two situations involve 
pre-trial requests for disclosure of evidence. [d. at 104-07. 
32. Earlier, the Supreme Court stated in Giglio V. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), 
that "whether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design, it is the re-
sponsibility of the prosecutor." [d. at 154. 
33. Smith V. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 218-20 (1982). 
34. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103; see also Giglio V. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) 
(quoting Napue V. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,271 (1959». At least one commentator has 
equated this test with the Larrison test. See 8A J. MOORE, supra note 12, ~ 33.04[1], 
at 33-38. 
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perjury.3S 
In Stevenson, the Court of Appeals of Maryland relied on a plethora 
of persuasive authority to deduce that courts will not grant a motion for 
new trial unless the evidence is material to the outcome of the case.36 
Furthermore, the court reasoned that when the motion is based on newly 
discovered evidence, this materiality determination must be conducted 
prior to applying either the Larrison or Berry standards.37 Applying this 
rule to the facts of the case, the court relied heavily upon the trial judge's 
ruling that the verdict "probably" would not be altered if a new trial 
were granted because the other evidence of guilt was so overwhelming.38 
The court held that, implicit in the trial judge's decision was a finding 
that the perjured testimony was immaterial to the outcome of the case.39 
As a result, the evidence could not satisfy the threshold materiality in-
quiry; thus, the court concluded, there was no need to adopt either the 
Larrison or the Berry stand~rd. 40 
The Stevenson court further held that, because the evidence was not 
material to the outcome of the case, there had been no denial of due 
process and, therefore, no need for a new trial on that ground.41 Relying 
on several Supreme Court and United States courts of appeals decisions, 
the court reasoned that the same initial materiality inquiry used to evalu-
ate newly discovered evidence applied with equal force to due process 
violations.42 The court reasoned "that the knowing and intentional use 
of false testimony by the prosecution is a violation of due process provid-
ing such testimony is material to the result of the case."43 Finally, the 
court distinguished Stevenson on its facts from an Illinois case involving 
the same expert witness.44 The perjury in the Illinois case had resulted in 
35. These cases "involve a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process." 
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104 (dictum); see, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,153-
54 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 
U.S. 103, 112 (1935). 
36. Stevenson v. State, 299 Md. 297, 301-04, 473 A.2d 450, 452-53 (1984). 
37. Id. at 301-02, 473 A.2d at 452-53. On appeal, the defendant urged the court to 
adopt the "might" standard. Id. at 301, 473 A.2d at 452. 
38. Id. at 301, 473 A.2d at 451-52. Adopting the "probability" standard, the trial judge 
relied upon Ginnelly v. Continental Paper Co., 57 N.J. Super. 480, 155 A.2d 154 
(1959). Stevenson, 299 Md. at 301, 473 A.2d at 451-52. 
39. Stevenson, 299 Md. at 301, 473 A.2d at 452. 
40. Id. at 301-04, 473 A.2d at 452-53. 
41. Id. at 304-08, 473 A.2d at 453-55. The defendant alleged a lack of diligence on the 
part of the prosecution in not checking the expert's credentials. Brief for Appellant 
Stevenson at 28-29, Stevenson v. State, 299 Md. 297, 473 A.2d 450 (1984). The 
state responded by arguing that it did not know of the perjury and that this lack of 
knowledge was not unreasonable. Moreover, even if there had been a due process 
violation, the state contended that the perjury did not relate to a material aspect of 
the trial. Brief for Appellee State at 14-17, Stevenson v. State, 299 Md. 297, 473 
A.2d 450 (1984). 
42. Stevenson, 299 Md. at 305, 473 A.2d at 453. 
43. Id. at 305, 473 A.2d at 453-54. 
44. Id. at 308, 473 A.2d at 455 (distinguishing People v. Comille, 95 III. 2d 497, 448 
N.E.2d 857 (1983». 
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the grant of a new trial. 4S 
The court of appeals's adoption of an initial materiality inquiry for 
new trial motions based upon newly discovered evidence reflects a mis-
perception of the Larrison and Berry standards. Recognizing that mate-
riality in this context is a matter of degree, these standards seek to 
balance the interests of preserving the finality of judgments and judicial 
economy,46 with the injustice of convictions returned by juries that were 
denied the whole truth.47 Because the decision to grant a new trial neces-
sarily depends on the materiality of the perjury,48 whether the evidence is 
material to the result is not, as the court states, the threshold question;49 
it is the principal consideration. The two tests, requiring the evidence to 
be such as would probably or possibly produce an acquittal, are simply 
means of testing materiality, and the application of either standard ana-
lytically assimilates the question of materiality. so Instructing trial judges 
to decide initially whether the newly discovered evidence is material to 
the result of the case makes any subsequent application of either standard 
redundant. In Stevenson, for example, the trial judge evaluated the likeli-
hood of a different verdict if the jury had not heard the perjured testi-
mony.51 The trial judge effectively concluded that the Berry 
"probability" standard was not met, and therefore no new trial should be 
granted. This analysis conflicts directly with the court of appeals's hold-
ing that the possible effect on the jury's determination is a separate in-
quiry, warranted only after the evidence is found to be material to the 
outcome of the case. S2 Yet, materiality to the outcome of the case must 
be defined by the possible effect of the new evidence on the jury's deter-
mination. The unanswered question is: How can a trial judge determine 
materiality without at the same time examining the possible effect of the 
new evidence on the jury's determination? 
The Stevenson decision contains no guidelines to aid either trial 
courts in making initial materiality determinations or appellate courts in 
reviewing lower court decisions. There is a good reason for according 
great deference to the trial judge; in most cases, he had the opportunity 
45. The facts of People v. Cornille, 95 Ill. 2d 497,448 N.E.2d 857 (1983) and Stevenson 
were nearly identical. In Comille, false testimony given by the same expert 
prompted the Supreme Court of Illinois to find a due process violation and to re-
verse a conviction. The court held that "there is a reasonable likelihood that. . . 
[the] false testimony concerning his qualifications as an expert might have affected 
the jury's decision." Comille, 95 Ill. 2d at 514, 448 N.E.2d at 866. The Stevenson 
court justified its decision by finding the amount of expert testimony to be more 
balanced as to the cause of the fire in Comille. Stevenson, 299 Md. at 308, 473 A.2d 
at 455. 
46. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
47. See supra note 19. 
48. See 8A J. MOORE, supra note 12, ~ 33.04[1]; 4 C. TORCIA supra note 12, § 599. 
49. Stevenson, 299 Md. at 302, 473 A.2d at 452. 
50. See 8A J. MOORE, supra note 12, ~ 33.04[1], at 33-34. 
51. Stevenson, 299 Md. at 301, 473 A.2d at 451. 
52. Id. at 302, 473 A.2d at 453. 
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to hear all the evidence, including the perjured testimony. Thus, the trial 
judge is in the best position to evaluate the potential impact of the newly 
discovered evidence on the jury's verdict.s3 This is not to imply, how-
ever, that the trial judge's decision should not be reviewable on appeal. 
There still is a need for a standard to guide trial courts seeking to gauge 
how material perjured testimony must be to warrant a new trial. Such a 
standard would help ensure uniformity of decisions on these motions and 
an accurate, objective review at the appellate level. The Maryland judici-
ary has already shown a strong policy of deference to trial judges' rulings 
on new trial motions. S4 Stevenson can only serve to give the trial courts 
more discretionary power since Maryland's highest court neither offers 
nor requires a basis for a finding of immateriality. 
In view of the need for guidance, the Larrison standard should be 
adopted in Maryland because instances of perjured testimony impugn the 
integrity of the criminal justice system. ss Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that perjury poisons "the water in [the] reservoir, and the 
reservoir cannot be cleansed without first draining it of all impurity."s6 
Moreover, an examination of jurisdictions applying the Larrison test dis-
proves its critics' contention that it necessarily will always result in the 
granting of a new trial. S7 Larrison, therefore, is a justified modification of 
the stricter Berry standard for cases involving perjured testimony. 
In analyzing the due process issue, the Stevenson court carried this 
undefined threshold materiality determination to its extreme. Implicit in 
its treatment of this issue is a failure to recognize the scope of 
prosecutorial misconduct as well as a failure to define the appropriate 
standard of materiality. Because the prosecution in Stevenson was una-
ware of the expert's false representations about his credentials, S8 the due 
process issue centered on prosecutorial negligence. Failing even to con-
sider this issue, the court limits alleged due process violations to in-
stances of knowing and intentional use of false testimony by the 
prosecution,s9 directly in conflict with the Supreme Court's articulation 
of a "should have known" standard.60 Additionally, the court of ap-
peals's reason for allowing the defendant to raise the due process issue for 
the first time on appeal is unclear; the court failed to inquire whether the 
prosecution was at fault because it "should have known" of the expert's 
perjury. 
53. See generally 8A J. MOORE, supra note 12, ~ 33.03[4]. 
54. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
55. See supra note 19. 
56. Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. I, 14 (1956) (the courts have a duty "to see that 
the waters of justice are not polluted"). 
57. See, e.g., ex rei Williams v. Walker, 535 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); 
United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 
(1975); United States v. Bonilla, 503 F. Supp. 626 (D.P.R. 1980). 
58. Stevenson, 299 Md. at 304-05, 473 A.2d at 453. 
59. Id. at 305, 473 A.2d at 453-54. 
60. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text. 
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Had this "should have known" inquiry been resolved against the 
state, the lower standard of materiality mandated by United States v. 
Agurs 61 should have been applied. It looks to whether there is "any rea-
sonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judg-
ment of the jury."62 Rather than discussing the Supreme Court's test for 
materiality in cases where the state should have known of the perjury, 
the Stevenson court simply cited it as authority for the general proposi-
tion that perjured testimony must be material to the outcome of a case to 
warrant a new tria1.63 Once again, the trial judge's ruling was cited as 
support for a finding that the perjured testimony was immaterial to the 
result of the case.64 Thus, the evidence received the same treatment 
under both claims. The United States Supreme Court, however, has cau-
tioned that "[i]f the standard applied to the usual motion for a new trial 
based on newly discovered evidence were the same when the evidence 
was in the State's possession as when it was found in a neutral source, 
there would be no special significance to the prosecutor's obligation to 
serve the cause of justice."6s Furthermore, relying on the trial judge's 
ruling for a finding of immateriality in this context is inappropriate, be-
cause the trial judge never considered the due process issue. 
Both holdings in Stevenson, therefore, are troublesome. First, the 
decision articulates a threshold materiality requirement that is already 
included in both the Larrison and Berry standards. This approach repre-
sents a misconception of the purpose of each of these options: to weigh 
varying degrees of materiality. Additionally, the court's new trial analy-
sis is conspicuously lacking in guidance for the state's trial courts. The 
appellate courts will probably fill this void by deferring, in an increasing 
number of cases, to the trial court's exercise of discretion. As a result, 
there is an increased likelihood of a lack of uniformity among the trial 
courts' decisions on these motions. Second, the court's due process anal-
ysis is directly contradicted by Supreme Court authority. Not only did 
the court fail to consider instances involving prosecutorial negligence, 
but it also neglected to apply the materiality standard articulated by the 
very cases it cites in support of its proposition. Accordingly, it is not 
clear to what extent Stevenson will affect future decisions. The only cer-
tainty that arises from the case is that considerable confusion will exist 
until the court definitively resolves these issues. 
Nicole Porter 
61. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
62. [d. at 103. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
63. Stevenson, 299 Md. at 306-07, 473 A.2d at 454. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 
150 (1972) is cited for the standard. [d. Agurs is cited as an example of cases of 
other "factual contexts concerning due process." [d. at 307, 473 A.2d at 455. 
64. [d. at 308, 473 A.2d at 455. 
65. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111. 
